

30 April 2013

Advice to the European Medicines Agency from the Clinical trial Advisory Group on Rules of engagement (CTAG3)

Draft Advice Version 5.0 – Clean version

1 Advice to the European Medicines Agency on rules of 2 engagement for accessing clinical trial data

3 Draft – 27 February 2013 - Version 5.0 (versions 2.0 to 4.0 internal drafts)

4 Preliminary comment:

5 EMA should only disclose confidential commercial information from non-clinical and clinical study
6 reports and patient level data when there is an overriding public interest reason for doing so, under
7 conditions which serve that interest. The EMA should always consult with the marketing
8 authorisation holder (MAH) prior to disclosure, to allow the MAH to take any necessary steps to
9 protect against unfair competition and/ or prejudice to regulatory data protection, patent or other
10 IP rights.

11 Note from EMA: stakeholders are invited to present at next CTAG3 meeting concrete (historic?)
12 examples and case scenarios how confidential commercial information from CSRs could be used for
13 unfair competition and/ or prejudice to regulatory data protection, patent or other IP rights and
14 what 'necessary steps' might be required. (See also comment under section3)

15 What steps will a requester have to go through before being able to access clinical trial data from
16 the EMA website? After accessing the dedicated domain of the EMA website:

17 **1. Should requesters have to identify themselves?**

18 It is useful to distinguish between access to (1) aggregate data (e.g. lists of studies conducted, ICH
19 compliant clinical study reports including the study protocol, statistical analysis plan and other
20 appendices, but excluding patient level data) and (2) patient-level data (e.g. individual case record
21 forms, SAS files with line listings).

22 1. Aggregate data: No agreement was reached. The following positions were discussed:

23 a. There is no convincing rationale that identification of requesters could or should be
24 required. Such data should be accessible freely (similar to EPAR information today).
25 It is assumed that aggregate data contains no personal data.

26 b. In the interest of transparency, requesters should be identified, logged and their
27 identity made public, primarily to ensure patient confidentiality is not compromised
28 and to avoid the misuse of patient level data by third parties with commercial
29 interests that are not related to healthcare research. Requesters of clinical trial
30 data should also have sufficient qualifications and experience for any subsequent
31 analysis of data obtained from clinical trials, as aligned with ICH-E9 and 'statistical
32 principles for clinical trials'. Also, in order for any analysis of data obtained from
33 clinical trials, there should be a legitimate scientific question being proposed in
34 order for the request for data access to be considered. Requesters should not only
35 identify themselves, but they should also provide details of their qualifications and
36 experience which supports they are sufficiently educated and trained to implement

37 any subsequent analysis of the data being requested. This information should be
38 made transparent by the requester at the time of seeking access to data.

39 NOTE from EMA: such proposals may not be compatible with the legal framework under
40 which EMA operates as a public body; to be discussed at upcoming CTAG3 meeting

41 2. Patient-level data: No agreement was reached. The following positions were discussed:

42 a. These data should be freely accessible without the need for identification.

43 Arguments in favour of this position include (not in order of importance):

44 i. Lowering the hurdle for patients who wish to access data related to their
45 own disease;

46 ii. Proper verification of identity of the requester is near-impossible;

47 iii. If the data are used for illegal actions such as illegitimate commercial use,
48 there are legal actions which can be taken against the firm/country
49 benefiting from the illegal action. Thus, this point should not be an
50 argument to force requester-identification. Furthermore, if someone wishes
51 the data for illegal action, he will surely and easily use a wrong
52 identification or could only ask others to also request data in order to
53 increase the number of suspects;

54 iv. Any patient-level data that EMA makes available will be de-
55 identified/anonymised, therefore the risk of retro-active patient
56 identification is considered acceptably low, and the patient data protection
57 is not an issue (it is argued that there is even no need to distinguish
58 between aggregate data and patient level data). Therefore, there is no
59 need to verify the identity of the requester (*Note: reference is made to*
60 *CTAG1, which is discussing standards for de-identification/anonymisation to*
61 *ensure patient data protection*);

62 v. There are cases of harassment by pharmaceutical industry when a
63 physician declared an adverse event to an agency (example: Dr Chiche in
64 Marseilles about the Mediator story). If the name of the requesters is given
65 to EMA, how will EMA make sure that the name of the requester will not be
66 known by the Marketing Authorisation Holder? In case of harassment linked
67 to a data request, what would be EMA's responsibility?

68 vi. The privacy of study participants is important and their privacy should be
69 warranted. On the other hand, the privacy should also be warranted for
70 study participants, patients or other (EU) citizens who like to access
71 patient-level data for their own private use. Namely, publication of their
72 name on the internet involves the risk of unintended use of the personal
73 data of this person, especially if this information can be detected by search
74 engines such as Google. For example, the information (name + type of
75 medication) may be detected during a background search performed for a
76 job application; the information can be used by insurance companies; or
77 the information can be used for direct marketing for registered or falsified
78 medicines, including spamming. This is an argument to carefully consider
79 whether the benefits of publication of the names of private persons

80 outweigh the risks of unintended use and breach of privacy of those who
81 access data. Thus, benefits of publication of the names of those who access
82 patient level data may not outweigh the risks, because publication of
83 personal data in combination with (type of) medicines for which data have
84 been accessed creates the possibility for unintended and undesirable use of
85 personal data;

86 vii. As data would be anonymous there is no sensitive data. Retrospective
87 patient identification cannot be prevented by verifying the identity of the
88 requester, nor can any violator necessarily be identified through such
89 knowledge as there will usually be no conclusive link between the violation
90 and the requester. We should keep in mind article 6.1. b and c. in directive
91 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
92 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
93 personal data and on the free movement of such data. Pursuant to this
94 article collection of data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in
95 relation to the purposes. Registering the requester is also processing of
96 personal data and should only be done for legitimate reasons and should
97 not be excessive in relation to the purpose.

98 b. These data should be freely accessible only after verification of the identity of the
99 requester. Arguments in favour of this position include (not in order of
100 importance):

101 i. Patient-level data is too sensitive to allow anonymous requesters to access
102 because the risk of retrospective patient identification is never zero. The
103 legal liability associated with the release of the patient data from a data
104 privacy perspective needs to be considered. There is reference to the risk of
105 retro-active patient identification being “acceptably low”, yet that still
106 presents a risk to patient identification. Legal accountability needs to be
107 addressed if a patient is in fact identified and this is used improperly
108 against an individual patient;

109 ii. The level of de-identification required to render patient-level data suitable
110 for open public access is likely to seriously compromise the utility of that
111 data for the purpose of research in the interest of public health. Much of
112 the value of analysis of patient-level data over aggregate data is the ability
113 to link and take account of patient characteristics in analyses. For example,
114 if age and gender were to be removed from the dataset, it would not be
115 possible to investigate possible treatment interactions with these
116 characteristics or with these in combination with other characteristics that
117 remain in the dataset. If dates are removed this reduces scope for scrutiny
118 and (unless replaced with a series of derived times from event to event)
119 precludes time to event analyses. This would mean, for example, that
120 survival analyses in cancer trials would not be possible. This is an important
121 consideration for individual participant data systematic (IPD) reviews and
122 meta-analyses. Re-consider whether tiered access is feasible. Open public
123 access for all documentation including clinical study reports, results, and
124 aggregate data. Access to IPD restricted to being for the purpose of
125 research in the interest of public health - as demonstrated by provision of a

- 126 protocol or research plan, disclosure of investigator name and affiliation
127 and declaration of any potential conflict of interest (preferably at the point
128 of release of data, but delayed if necessary);
- 129 iii. Strict assurances about the specific use of personal data are given as part
130 of the consent process to trial entry; they do not include release except
131 under strict rules. Release of individual patient data, even anonymised,
132 contravenes the information provided as part of the consent process, and
133 thereby infringes human rights.
- 134 iv. There is a risk of illegitimate commercial use of patient-level data (please
135 refer to **point 3**). To mitigate this risk the identity of the requester must be
136 verified;
- 137 v. The identity of the requester should be available and public. It is widely
138 accepted in science that people have to disclose their financial interest. This
139 principle should be applied here as well;
- 140 vi. The objective is clearly to restore trust in the system, not to create an all-
141 purpose research tool. Patient data is not to be diverted to research
142 purposes for which it was never intended or to "data mining", be it
143 academic or commercial. Such misuse could otherwise lead to false claims
144 of efficacy and safety of medicines. The EMA has previously stated the
145 objective is to "(...) enable the independent re-analysis of the evidence
146 used by the Agency's committees to determine their benefits and risks and
147 is expected to lead to public-health benefits." The access process should be
148 developed with this public health principle in mind;
- 149 c. For access, a hierarchy for different user groups should be foreseen with access to
150 different types of data. For the EMA pharmacovigilance database, such an access
151 policy already exists. (EMA/759287/2009 corr., EudraVigilance access policy for
152 medicines for human use) This paper is adopted after consultation with the
153 Patients' and Consumers' Working Party and consultation with the Health Care
154 Professional Working Group. The paper defines 4 types of stakeholder groups:
- 155 • Medicines Regulatory Authorities, the European Commission and the
156 Agency (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group I)
 - 157 • Healthcare Professionals and the General Public (hereafter referred to as
158 Stakeholder Group II)
 - 159 • Marketing Authorisation Holders and Sponsors of Clinical Trials
160 (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group III)
 - 161 • Research Organisations (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group IV)
- 162 There is a need to modify the categories according to an optional user identification
163 process, granting access to e.g. patient level after authorisation. This would also
164 allow for the processes discussed under topics 3, 4 and 6, setting reminders or
165 making registered users aware of possible consequences after misuse.

166 **2. Should requesters be required to 'Agree' to respect personal data protection?**

167 It is agreed that this point is only relevant for patient-level data.

168 It is agreed that any requirement for the requester to actively agree to respect personal data
169 protection would depend on whether the identity of the requester can be/has been verified. (No
170 agreement was reached on that point, see above)

171 If the identity of the requester has not been verified (two positions):

172 a) Without requester identification, such `agreement` to respect personal data protection is
173 only for information, but cannot be legally binding. As far as CTAG1 rules for patient data
174 anonymisation are applied and effective, respect of personal data protection mainly forbids
175 linking the data obtained from EMA with other databases/information.

176 b) Even if the identity of a requester cannot be verified, a disclaimer about the need for
177 personal data protection should be "read and accepted" by the requester.

178 If the identity of the requester has been verified:

179 Should it be/have been possible to verify the identity of the requester, and the requester actively
180 agrees to respect personal data protection, any violation of this agreement should be legally
181 enforceable.

182 Requesters have to be made aware of EU and local data protection regulations. Ticking a box
183 implies a contractual relationship between the requester and the database owner/holder of the
184 data. However, in that case both contractual parties need to be fully identifiable. A contractual but
185 not necessarily public "digital" agreement appears to be preferable compared to a purely
186 anonymous process.

187 Details of a contractual agreement should clarify that if any individuals are provided access to
188 clinical trial data, then the holders of the data cannot be held accountable in any way for what the
189 requesters subsequently do with the data; any re-analysis of the data is at the responsibility of the
190 requester. If subsequent issues are found with respect to an incorrect re-analysis, misuse of the
191 data for purposes outside of the research proposal originally specified, or any potential fraudulent
192 behaviour, the original owner of the source data cannot be held accountable in any way.

193 **3. Should the requester be required to 'Agree' to refrain from unintended**
194 **commercial uses of information retrieved?**

195 There is general agreement that EMA's policy on Access to clinical trial data should further the
196 interest of public health, but should not abet usage of data for unintended commercial uses (e.g.
197 obtaining a marketing authorisation in a third, non-EU, jurisdiction). EMA's policy should attempt to
198 mitigate this risk without compromising transparency. The option of requiring anonymous data
199 requesters to tick a 'read and accepted' tick box is considered ineffectual.

200 No agreement was reached on the following point (two positions):

201 a) The requester should be required to sign a legally binding agreement affirming that the
202 information and data will only be used for the agreed public health research purpose and
203 not for any commercial use. Requests for patient level data from requesters to the EMA
204 must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and follow consistent criteria to establish if and
205 how the information provided will be used for valid scientific purposes and to benefit
206 patients.

- 207 b) It is unclear which situations we are talking about and "unintended commercial uses" may
208 be used as a "killer argument". For example, if industry fears that one cannot exclude that
209 a full CSR may be used for obtaining a marketing authorisation in a non-EU jurisdiction,
210 this may prevent full transparency. Some real-life examples of "unintended commercial
211 uses" should be given during the next CTAG3 session.

212 **4. Should the requester be made aware of quality standards for additional /**
213 **secondary analyses?**

214 No agreement was reached on this point (two positions):

- 215 a) It is emphasised that advising requesters of quality standards for additional secondary
216 analyses should not and cannot impose any obligations on the requester. (*Note: Reference*
217 *is made to the work of CTAG4*).

218 The use of such advice is questioned. This may discourage non-professional users from
219 downloading and using such data. There is no benefit from such advice but it may mean a
220 subjective additional hurdle to lay groups/patients.

- 221 b) The requester should be advised of quality standards for additional secondary analyses.
222 The same standards must be applied equally to the requester as would be applied to the
223 MAH. It is emphasised that such advice should imply clear obligations on the requester.

224 **5. Should the requester have to declare whether they wish to upload a protocol /**
225 **analysis plan?**

226 There is agreement that good scientific practise requires those who wish to engage in secondary
227 data analysis to complete and submit a study protocol before accessing the data. Therefore, the
228 opportunity (but not obligation) to upload a protocol on an EMA managed repository is welcomed.
229 There was no consensus as to the time of publication of such uploaded protocols. Options discussed
230 were:

- 231 a) Immediately after uploading the protocol
232 b) After a fixed time span (e.g. 1 month, 1 year?)
233 c) Around the time of publication of the results of secondary analysis
234 d) Timing of publication decided by requester

235 Several comments/views along the following lines were expressed:

236 A requester should have to submit a protocol or analysis plan before being granted access to the
237 data as this enables full transparency of the purpose and intention for requesting access to the
238 data and this helps to minimise any misuse by third parties. In order to ensure there is a legitimate
239 research question(s) being proposed, pre-specifying the clinical hypotheses to be investigated
240 ensures the scientific credibility of the research to be undertaken.

241 Provision of a protocol demonstrating good research methods, fair use of data and the purpose to
242 which it will be put seems an entirely reasonable exchange for access to data. There seems to be a
243 danger of introducing double standards with requirement for access to clinical trial protocols and
244 clinical trial data, but not to protocols for subsequent use. For IPD, make provision of a protocol

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245 (with delayed public access if necessary) a prerequisite for access to or release of data. A link to a
246 formally published protocol would be acceptable.

247 Therefore the protocol must be reviewed before the patient level data is provided.

248 NOTE from EMA: such proposals may not be compatible with the legal framework under which EMA
249 operates as a public body; to be discussed at upcoming CTAG3 meeting

250 **6. Should requesters be allowed to share accessed data?**

251 It was agreed that this is a moot point in case identification of the requester is not verifiable.

252 No agreement was reached on the following point of sharing data (two positions):

253 a) Should it be/have been possible to verify the identity of the requester, EMA may consider
254 restricting data sharing. However, in such case any third party would have to be given
255 access to the same data as the first requester directly from the EMA.

256 b) Requesters should not be allowed to share accessed data because that way the validity of
257 the dataset cannot be controlled. Requesters should need to explicitly confirm that they will
258 not forward the downloaded original dataset to third parties. It is acknowledged that others
259 must be able to repeat research findings; that is a basic principle of research. However,
260 such groups would then have to identify themselves separately before accessing the same
261 data.

262 **7. How should EMA's policy be rolled out (timelines)?**

263 There was brief discussion as to whether the policy should be rolled out in a staggered way,
264 starting with high-level (aggregated) data, followed by more granular (patient-level) data sets. No
265 conclusion was reached (three positions).

266 a) If the name of the requester is not needed for aggregated data, then most points do not
267 need further discussion. A staggered roll-out should not delay implementation of the rules
268 to make data publicly available.

269 There is no obvious benefit and no reason to use a staggered way other than limited
270 capacity. Hence, there is no reason to postpone access to patient-level data

271 b) A staggered roll-out would be preferable as there are already many challenges to opening
272 up access to aggregated data which need to be solved. Aligning with the roll-out of the
273 EudraCT version 9 and access to results for many clinical trials could be an important step
274 forward.

275 c) A staggered approach would be pragmatic and could achieve much almost immediately.
276 There are many issues around the release of IPD, particularly around open public access
277 versus some model of conditional access. If this could be set aside for now with focus on
278 release of aggregate data and results of all statistical analyses as set out in the trial
279 protocol, rapid progress could be made. Access to IPD could follow after sufficient time for
280 discussion and enquiry. For example, potential impact of public release of IPD on
281 participant consent needs to be investigated. Therefore, separate the issues of (1) release
282 and access to trial information, results and aggregate data from (2) release and access to
283 IPD, and move ahead immediately with 1. Do not delay implementation of 1 while 2 is

284 addressed (it is much more complex and requires careful consideration). Extend the time
285 period to allow proper consideration and investigation of issues pertaining to 2.

286 **8. Should requesters be encouraged to provide feedback?**

287 There is agreement that users of data should be encouraged to link back the results of their
288 analyses to the accessed data in order to ensure two-way transparency.

289 While a link back of results of individual analyses is desirable, it should be located on a separate
290 database in order to not increase subjective hurdles to lay people. This database should/could be
291 linked to the database of analysis plans/protocols.

292 It may also be useful to add a user/log-in concept to the repository to allow requesters to build
293 project websites. These project websites would give requesters the opportunity to publish
294 timelines, the protocol and the results of their project (or links to such documents).

295 Several comments/views along the following lines were expressed:

296 • Just encouraging requesters to link their analyses back to the data accessed is not
297 sufficient. Further discussion is needed on how any resulting publications arising from
298 secondary analyses are linked back to data access requests. Principles should be included
299 on minimal expectations of requesters and what should be fed back having been granted
300 access to data. For example, should the requester have to summarise their key findings of
301 their analyses as a minimum?

302 • On the assumption that access to anonymised patient level data is granted for a defined
303 research project, access to a secure area should be granted for a defined duration (the
304 duration necessary to complete the project). An open-ended access (beyond the research
305 project) would undermine the benefits of identification and declaration of research
306 purposes. NOTE from EMA: such proposals may not be compatible with the legal framework
307 under which EMA operates as a public body; to be discussed at upcoming CTAG3 meeting